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It is a cliché to say science and religion are antagonistic.  The outlook is often promulgated by 
religious people uneducated in the workings of science, and equally by scientifically-oriented individuals with 
little experience of religion.  This essay counters purported enmity between scientific and religious frameworks 
by identifying similar action organizing metaphysical principles that infuse each.   
 
It should be stated up front that I have no interest in evaluating proofs for God’s existence, or 
defending young earth creationism, or championing the notion that there is one true religion, nor still the thesis 
that morality demands divine guidance—all positions commonly cited to show the stupidity of religion, even 
though they are hardly universal among theists.1  More broadly, I will not insinuate what we should believe.  
Instead, my goal is to expand the range of what we can accept with rational warrant, leaving it to each to 
decide what stances to adopt.  I accordingly have no beef with either atheist or theists.  I do, however, target 
views circulating in New Atheist quarters that narrowly—and I will argue incorrectly—identify religion with  
superstitious nonsense: a scourge and illness to be cured through rational interventions.   
 
Scientific and Religious Belief in the Unseen 
 
A standard objection that critics of theism raise—and often quite fairly—is that religious practitioners 
frame claims such that they are beyond empirical testing.  Carl Sagan demonstrates when he asks us to suppose 
someone proclaims a dragon lives in their garage.  The person goes on to say that we cannot see the dragon 
because it is invisible; we cannot trace its footsteps because it floats; we cannot reveal the dragon by spray 
painting it because its immaterial form does not bind with chemical substances; we cannot detect its fiery 
breath with infrared sensors because the flames are heatless.  In short, there is no possible test that could affirm 
or refute the existence of the dragon, 2 and critics of theism argue the same for God and other religious claims.3  
  
The scenario detailed in the dragon parable gets close to what the pragmatic philosopher William 
James—who will be a companion throughout this piece—called “halfway empiricism.”  Halfway 
empiricism—which, by definition, is anti-pluralistic—characterizes a position that would reject observations 
contesting a cherished stance on the grounds that the data must be mistaken.4   Interestingly, the tendency 
pervades the sciences.  Occasionally it occurs on the level of specific hypotheses, as with a recent author 
rejecting the existence of plant minds by stipulating that psychic life necessitates internal representations,5 
effectively discounting cognitively and perceptually rich capacities identified in plants.6  More often 
scientifically-oriented individuals fall into halfway empiricism at the level of metaphysical positions they 
adopt as starting points.  Consider the notion that nature is lawlike, otherwise known as the principle of 
uniformity.  Scientists invariably take this to imply that nature is mathematizable, whether in terms of 
absolutely predictable outcomes or statistical probabilities.  With this metaphysical outlook as a starting point, 
random results are almost never taken as showing that a phenomenon is purely haphazard; even if replicated, 
they are rarely published, unless perhaps contesting an established result.  Having such biasing limits in place, 
it may be that conceptions of the lawlike nature of the universe are exaggerated, and insofar as mathematizable 
realities become the only ones entering thought, the resulting view is also anti-pluralistic.    
 
Closely related to lawlike notions of the universe is the conclusion that the future will resemble the 
past.  Such a supposition undergirds induction: the principle whereby we generalize, say, that because this 
medication worked on this group of people, it will have the same effect on the population at large, which is 
necessarily a projection that future cases will resemble the current one.  Empirical verification of the inductive 
 
1 See generally Hitchens, Dawkins, Harris and Dennett (2019). 
2 Sagan (1995), p. 160. 
3 For example, Dawkins (2006), Ch. 2; Russel (1952), pp. 543-548. 
4 see James (1897a), p. 447 
5 Maher (2019). 
6 For example, Trewavas (2014). 
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principle itself might be attempted by sampling earlier instances, and seeing whether the future resembles the 
past in these cases.  The problem is that generalizing the future validity of induction would require assuming 
the very principle we are attempting to verify.7  Notice, then, that the principle of induction and broader 
mathematical ontologies are not adopted by scientists because of empirical evidence, but regardless of it.   
When it comes specifically to the principle of uniformity, the vision is so engrained that most scientists deem 
contradicting evidence—when it arises in the form of haphazard findings—as mistaken.  That is, such evidence 
is taken to indicate that one is not looking hard enough or in the right places, in short, that things must be 
different than they empirically appear in observation.   
 
Sam Harris—a figurehead in the New Atheist movement in company with Richard Dawkins, Daniel 
Dennett and Christopher Hitchens—notes that the New Testament defines faith as “the assurance of things 
hoped for, the conviction of things not seen,”8 an idea repeated in other religious texts such as the Qur’an.9  
Harris goes on to say that the quoted New Testament passage, if “read in the right way,” will “render faith 
entirely self-justifying.”10  Specifically, he argues that “the very fact that one believes in something which has 
not yet come to pass (‘things hoped for’) or for which one has no evidence (‘things not seen’)” is taken as 
spurious “evidence for its actuality (‘assurance’).”11 There is an element of truth in Harris’s assessment, as we 
shall see, but also a failure to recognize pragmatic implications that apply equally to science and religion.    
 
James, for example, considers the principle of uniformity to be “far more like a religious faith than 
like assent to a demonstration.”12  He arrives at a similar conclusion about the notion that all changes have 
causes, a principle widely held by scientists, even if it gets a little murky in quantum mechanics.  Here, too, 
scientists do not properly observe causes, but instead successions of phenomena, with some elements 
consistently preceded and hence “caused” by others.13  However, the principle of causality and indeed the 
concept of “cause” demand a “deeper sort of inward connection between phenomena than their merely habitual 
time-sequence. ... The word ‘cause’ is, in short, an altar to an unknown god; an empty pedestal still marking 
the place of a hoped-for statue.”14  These words are partly drawn from the New Testament, which mentions an 
altar to an unknown god,15 and James argues that science requires faith in things not seen.   
There are a number of ways in which this is so.  First, science sometimes progresses “by ignoring 
conditions which are always present.”16  This occurred when Galileo grasped kinematic motion by envisaging 
marbles rolling over nonexistent frictionless surfaces, and Isaac Newton conceived his laws by reducing 
celestial bodies to point-like objects.  Second and as already intimated, science depends on faith in the unseen 
insofar as science accepts empirically unverifiable metaphysical principals.  But while profoundly unempirical, 
such metaphysical attitudes are pragmatically justified insofar as they lead to actions that promote certain 
empirical domains of inquiry.  For instance, positing material causes for cancer is a preliminary step in getting 
to the difficult task of understanding it and discovering treatments, and is accordingly pragmatically justified 
within the field of oncology.   
 
Scientific objections to religious stances, then, cannot be substantiated on the mere basis that the latter 
entail belief in the unseen—at least, not without seriously jeopardizing science.   However, the complaint 
might be justified if it turned out that religious faith lacks the knowledge expanding and life bettering potential 
that scientific varieties possess.  A pertinent question, therefore, is whether religious conviction in the unseen 




7 Hume (1740), Book 1, Part 3, Sect. VI 
8 Hebrews 11:1, Revised Standard Version. 
9 For example, 2:3. 
10 Harris (2004), p. 64. 
11 Harris (2004), p. 64. 
12 James (1890), p. 637. 
13 Hume (1740), Book 1, Part 3, Sect. II. 
14 James (1890), p. 671 
15 Acts 17:23. 
16 James (1890), p. 636 
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Faithful Belief as Action 
 
Faith and belief, according to James, organize action.  James thus identifies both with action, arguing 
“the test of belief is willingness to act,”17 and that  “there is some believing tendency wherever there is 
willingness to act at all.”18  He means not only that action measures conviction, but also that faithful belief 
functions to facilitate action.  When wavering between contradictory options, unsure what to believe, one 
hesitates to act, especially if moving forward carries momentous consequences.  With strong commitment, 
however, “inwardly stable” conviction—or faithful belief—arises, and “fills the mind solidly to the exclusion 
of contradictory ideas.  When this is the case, motor effects are apt to follow.”19  On the grounds that beliefs 
enable and guide action, James proposes that the truth of a belief  “is not a stagnant property,” but something 
that happens through “a process of valid-ation,”20 or what might alternatively be called valid-action.  The 
insight gets close to the phenomenological notion of truth as unveiling or revelation engendered through 
action, that is, as a kind of poetic twisting of reality that brings forth heretofore unseen dimensions. 21  Belief in 
atomic particles, for instance, has generated fruitful experimentation and theorizing that has opened us to 
heretofore unseen realities.  Hence it has led scientists to act in ways advancing their field.  So long as the 
belief continues to reliably cultivate beneficial or “valid” actions, scientists are apt to continue trusting it.  
 
Based on the intimate connection between action and belief, it seems to follow we can will ourselves 
into belief by acting as if the thing in question were real, but this does not merely mean we can convince 
ourselves on a psychological level; it means also that actions can generate phenomena and hence experiences 
or data that support our belief. 22  In science this is easy to see.  Using particle accelerators to create non-
naturally occurring exotic elements is one example of acting to generate phenomena verifying specific 
standpoints.  Comparable outcomes occur in everyday life.  A woman who acts on the belief—or has faith—
that she is not, after all, too sick for kick boxing practice effectively eliminates a symptom and experiential 
basis upon which she judged herself so very ill in the first place.  For James, “faith” means believing what 
might well be doubted: “as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act 
in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance.”23  Put otherwise, “faith is 
synonymous with working hypothesis”—“working” in the double sense of being unverified and of being a way 
of working or acting in the world.24    
 
In the same way that nature would hide many of her secrets from scientists if they did not act on 
certain unverifiable metaphysical principles, one can speculate the divine does the same for unbelievers.  
Regarding science, James writes: 
 
Without an imperious inner demand on our part for  ideal logical and mathematical 
harmonies, we should never have attained to proving that such harmonies lie hidden between 
all the chinks and interstices of the crude natural world.  Hardly a law has been established in 
science, hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first sought after, often with sweat and 
blood, to gratify an inner need.  Whence such needs come from we do not know: we find 
them in us, and biological psychology so far only classes them with Darwin’s “accidental 
variations.”25 
 
Of religious inclinations, James goes on to say that 
 
 
17 James (1882), p. 70. 
18 James (1896), p. 458. 
19 James (1890), p. 283. 
20 James (1907), P. 574. 
21 See Heidegger (1960), pp. 17-86. 
22 James (1890), p. 321. 
23 James (1882), p. 70. 
24 James (1882), p. 73. 
25 James (1895), pp. 497-498. 
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the inner need of believing that this world of nature is a sign of something more spiritual and 
eternal than itself is just as strong and authoritative in those who feel it, as the inner need of 
uniform laws of causation ever can be in a professionally scientific head.  The toil of many 
generations has proved the latter need prophetic. Why may not the former one be prophetic, 
too?  And if needs of ours outrun the visible universe, why may not that be a sign that an 
invisible universe is there?26 
 
It may be that the divine does not show itself clearly because our minds are closed and our attention selectively 
misdirected from indications of spiritual presence.  Or it may be that doubt prevents personal acquaintance 
with spiritual realities much as inordinate mistrust prevents people from forging social ties.27  But whatever the 
case, it may be that “our faith beforehand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come 
true.”28  
 
In mocking the earlier cited New Testament passage on faith, Harris unwittingly constructs an 
illustration that—with slight adjustment—reinforces just this point.  Harris sarcastically talks about feeling  
 
a certain, rather thrilling ‘conviction’ that Nicole Kidman is in love with me.  As we have 
never met, my feeling is my only evidence of her infatuation. I reason thus: my feelings 
suggest that Nicole and I must have a special, even metaphysical, connection—otherwise, 
how could I have this feeling in the first place?  I decide to set up camp outside her house to 
make the necessary introductions; clearly, this sort of faith is a tricky business.29 
 
This creepy parable is a strawmen example, so let us slightly modify it.  Suppose Jill has a crush on her 
classmate Jack.  If Jill gets evidence that Jack dislikes her, then we can agree that Jill should back off.  But if 
evidence is neutral, then the better part of reason may be to act on the assumption that the thing Jill wants to 
believe is true.  Notice this means putting the belief to the test, and risking it.  So maybe Jill will ask if Jack 
wants to meet some time to go over class notes.  If he emphatically says no, then Jill has evidence Jack is not 
into her.  He also may say yes, but just be interested in friendship.  But over time he may come to appreciate 
Jill romantically (or not); or maybe Jill discovers he loves her from the very beginning.  The point is that if 
nobody takes a small leap of faith, nothing happens, and further that by taking the small leap, Jill may actually 
generate the reality she wants to be true, as in the case of Jack first only liking her as a friend, but then, through 
further acquaintance, growing to developed feelings.   
 
Roughly speaking, science mirrors the Jack and Jill example insofar as beliefs generate actions, which 
engender empirical results.  Thus even scientific facts are products of human action, as when researchers either 
make light manifest as a wave or particle depending on whether experiments are set up on the assumption of 
the former or latter.  As the physicist David Finkelstein puts it polemically, it is as if we have entered an age of 
“non-objective physics.” 30  Werner Heisenberg pioneered “quantum theory in the same city and decade in 
which Kandinsky coined the phrase ‘non-objective art’,” and one may speculate he “borrowed from Kandinsky 
when he called quantum theory ‘non-objective physics.’”31  Whereas “classical physics  ... represses the 
observer and the act of observation and talks naively about ‘things as they are’,” a “main idea of quantum 
theory is to talk about what you do, not about ‘things as they are’.”32   
 
 A commonality between everyday, scientific and religious leaps of faith, therefore, is that all can 
actualize certain heretofore unrealized outcomes.  It is a trope in the New Testament that faith can move 
 
26 James (1895), p. 498. 
27 James (1896), p. 476. 
28 James (1895), p. 500.   
29 Harris (2004), p. 64. 
30 Finkelstein (2004), p. 182. 
31 Finkelstein (2004), p. 182. 
32Finkelstein (2004), p. 182, emphasis added.  
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mountains,33 and this is repeated by religious sages such as Mahatma Gandhi.34  The theme reoccurs in a 
Taoist text, where an old man wants to move mountains to make way for a road.  When chastised about the 
near impossibility of the task, he replies: “My descendants will go on forever, but the mountains will get no 
bigger.  Why should there be any difficulty about levelling it?”35  This gets straight to the pragmatic point: we 
can literally move mountains if we work long enough, or end world poverty, or vanquish the British Empire as 
Indians did through years of collective peaceful resistance.  We have put humans on the Moon, and might end 
HIV without a vaccine, bringing about its gradual demise by ensuring clean needles and widespread condom 
use, though this is not to blame the afflicted.  On a more immediate level, you might pray for the alleviation 
of the poor, and then hear an internal voice saying, “You can do something about that,” and act 
accordingly.  In this case, your actions answered your prayer, realizing its hopes.  Faith, then, is essential in 
science, religion and everyday life.  It is essential because it is a preliminary condition of realizing what was 
initially taken on faith insofar as it helps make the thing believed come into reality, therefore making it true.  
 
More Commonalities between Scientific and Religious Faith 
 
Related to the forgoing notions of faith is the idea that evidence is never enough to determine 
absolutely that something is true, though we can be extraordinarily certain.  The view is widely shared by 
scientists and taught in introductory research methods classes.  The notion is also carried in James’s theory of 
mind and knowledge, which assimilates evolution by natural selection. 36  James vehemently supports the 
theory, lauding the Darwinian precept that evolution requires two independent cycles of operation.37  The first 
cycle is one in which variations arise that are random in regard to whether they are adaptive.  The second is the 
process by which environmental pressures and consequential reproductive success or failure either lead the 
variation to be propagated or extinguished over time.  James conjectures the mind works the same way: that 
the unstable brain sometimes generates ideas that are either reinforced or extinguished depending on how well 
they work in our environment.  He also holds the environment supplies sensory variation, which impacts us 
more or less depending on what our interests bring to attention.  In either case, the environment does not 
impress ideas on us in a one-to-one manner, and data is always inadequate for forming absolute judgments.38   
 
James suggests, therefore, that we often have to make decisions on the basis of emotion.  After all, to 
say in the absence of adequate evidence, “‘Do not decide, but leave the question open,’ is itself a passional 
decision”—that is, a decision based on inclination, not evidence.39  If delayed decision does not have 
significant costs; or if going forward has enormous risks, then we may be inclined to sit back and wait.  Yet if 
longing for something “hoped for,” as the earlier quoted New Testament passage puts it, and if there is no 
strong evidence that our desire is unobtainable, then moving forward may be the better part of wisdom.  The 
Jack and Jill example is one case in point.  Another might be a scientist embracing HIV research in the 1980s.  
In both cases, the emotional hope—or faith—that things might work out favorably is part of what sustains 
action. 
 
Another commonality between scientific and religious faith is that it keeps people going in tough 
times.  Think about the lack of progress in many studies, and compare it to everyday life to see how much faith 
science requires.  If Jill had been asking Jack out unsuccessfully for even a year, she would give up, unless 
possessed by an unhealthy obsession.  But scientists keep going even after years of failure, as in the case of 
Kepler, and even Jill’s persistence after a few disappointments may eventually be rewarded.  There are no 
shortage of religious parables demonstrating a comparable point, such as the Israelites’ 40-year flight from 
Egypt to the Promised Land.  Even if one rejects the veracity of religious stories, we can imagine and typically 
know someone who has gotten through difficult times aided by faith. 
 
 
33 For example, Mark 11:23, Matthew 17:20, Matthew 21:21, 1 Corinthians 13:2. 
34 Gandhi (1925), p. 331. 
35 The Book of Lieh-tzu, p. 100 
36 See James (1880); James (1890), Ch. 28. 
37 James (1880), p. 622. 
38 See Crippen (2018). 
39 James (1896), 464. 
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A last commonality between scientific and religious faith is that both are experienced as lived 
realities.  Recall, again, that quite a bit resists the metaphysical notion that the universe is lawlike.  Scientists 
see all sorts of things that seem haphazard, just as we sometimes observe human behaviors that appear random, 
but this rarely shakes faith that there must be underlying laws or causes at play.  The sense that the universe is 
causally lawlike is enhanced further by the fact that random, chaotic results are almost never published in 
scientific journals, so that mathematization has become a gold-seal of what counts as “science.”  The principles 
of uniformity and causality accordingly weave so thoroughly into the world lived by most scientists that many 
are wont to see them as realities infusing nearly everything.  Further, acting faithfully on these principles has 
fruitfully generated outcomes and realized truths that otherwise would not have come into existence, thereby 
supplying pragmatic justification for adopting them.  Religious belief may similarly be fruitful for many, 
engendering actions that disclose spiritual insights.  As with the principles of uniformity and causality, 
moreover, the divine may exert an organizing influence on the lived world of believers such that they similarly 
sense it in flowers and trees, in life and being—almost as plainly as one senses the blue of the sky.  An 
example tying scientific and religious forms of life together is the painstaking observations and roughly 20 
years of mathematical labor driven by the search for God’s perfection in the cosmos that yielded Johannes 
Kepler’s laws of planetary motion.40  It is not self-evidently obvious why it is rational to seek mathematical 
perfection but irrational to seek God’s perfection, but more on this later. 
 
Epistemologies of Faith 
 
Based on the account so far offered, one can grant many central premises of New Atheists, but derive 
very different conclusions than they do.  Take the notion of “memes,” which Dawkins coins by combining 
“gene” with “mimema,” Greek for “imitated.”41  Memes are units of cultural imitation, and Dawkins describes 
how beliefs, customs and other cultural “units” propagate.  He models the account after his “selfish gene” 
theory.  This is the idea that genes—and not individual organisms—constitute fundamental units of selection.  
If true, then genes do not necessarily propagate because they bestow adaptive advantages on organisms.  
Rather, natural selection favors genes good at getting replicated, and this can incidentally include those 
conferring advantages.42  Transferring this precept to memes, Dawkins and others such as Dennett43 suggest 
that beliefs need not be rational, true or helpful to spread; they need only have attributes that induce us to 
maintain and copy them.  Dawkins cites Christianity as an illustration.  It mollifies and thus proliferates 
through “psychological appeal.”44  It eulogizes “faith” and “blind trust,” deterring tests that might damage its 
credibility.45  It identifies belief with virtue.46  It menaces doubters with “ghastly torments,” intimidating them 
into belief,47 though it is worth adding that not all Christians—much less all religions—advance a concept of 
hell.  Christianity further protects itself by peddling the platitude that science cannot arbitrate religious 
doctrine.48  Because of all this, Christianity nurtures cultural environments favoring its continuance.49  So 
while Christian belief is, for Dawkins, false and harmful, it is also highly contagious. 
 
To begin with, we can grant that psychological appeal—especially sentimental appeal—induces 
belief.  Yet this is not particularly damning since emotions often push us to better beliefs, as when tension 
arising out of irrational inconsistency motivates resolution into rational consistency, experienced with feelings 
 
40 See Hawking (2004), Ch. 3; Love (2009), pp. 15-17. 
41 Dawkins (1976), p. 206. 
42 Dawkins (1976), p. 12. Dawkins’s terminology is misleading insofar as genes do not have interests and therefore are not 
selfish.  Culture likewise does not reduce easily to discrete gene-like units or memes.  Dawkins (1976) acknowledges these 
shortcomings, but insists that he offers helpful metaphors in his terminology.  In fact, his language is not really useful, but merely 
catchy or meme-like, though this is not to deny a number of worthwhile insights in his work.  
43 For example, Dennett (2006), Chs. 1 and 7. 
44 Dawkins (1976), p. 207. 
45 Dawkins (2006), p. 212. 
46 Dawkins (2006), p. 199 
47 Dawkins (1976), p. 212 
48 Dawkins (2006), pp. 54-61 
49 Dawkins (1976), pp. 212-213; Dawkins (2006), pp. 197-199. 
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of pleasure and relief.50  Emotions also help us parse the perceptual world.51  James notes that concepts depend 
on emotional interests, so that a furniture maker might grasp oil as a wood darkener, compared to a mechanic 
regarding it primarily as a lubricant.52  Notice that both ways of cognizing connect to actual properties of oil, 
so there is nothing irrational going on here.  Dennett acknowledges that emotion can promote rationality,53 but 
the other three leading New Atheists—Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens—do not seriously consider the 
possibility.   
 
Emotions can simultaneously be less than rational.  There is the emotionally charged supposition that 
Latinx migrants in the United States are dangerous, even though they are less likely to commit crimes than 
native-born residents.54  There is also no shortage of prominent figures irrationally inflicting harm on others 
and themselves because of unchecked greed or sexual desire.  And we all know what it is to have anger get the 
better of us.  New Atheists seem to do just this at times, straying from reasoned discourse to irate diatribe and 
attempting to persuade by emotional appeal.   
 
Christopher Cotter, for example, observes that New Atheists confront readers “with absurd and 
emotive analogies,”55 such as Harris anticipating that future generations will regard faith without evidence with 
the same disgust that we reserve for slaveholders of the past.56  Cotter further points out that despite evidence 
that global violence is at an all-time low, New Atheists stress religious adherents who lie and kill,57 plan 
destruction,58 and eagerly anticipate the end of the world.59  Such attitudes are indeed held by some devotees, 
but hardly the majority.  Dawkins likes to emphasize that Nobel Laureates are overwhelmingly atheistic and 
that theists are stupider than average. 60  He does grant many of history’s great scientists were religious.61  This 
includes, for example, Newton and Kepler.  It also includes the cofounder of evolution by natural selection 
Alfred Russel Wallace, along with Georges Lemaître, the Catholic priest who first proposed what came to be 
known as the Big Bang theory.  However, Dawkins dismisses religious affiliation in such cases on the grounds 
that scientists were just adhering to the cultural prescriptions of their times,62 neglecting that today’s 
practitioners do likewise within the anti-theistic norms of academia.  Dawkins and Hitchens speculate that such 
intellectuals were perhaps secretly irreligious.63  Nothing really follows one way or the other out of scientists’ 
past or present religious dispositions.  What is clear is that New Atheists are guilty of confirmation bias and 
deploying emotional appeal by suggesting that one is foolish if still clinging to religious conviction today. 
 
Irrational tendencies aside, the fact remains that emotional capacities typically integrate fruitfully with 
action, cognition and perception.  Thus we often experience anger as a rational self-defense mechanism, 
whether when dealing with someone trying to cheat or hurt us, or responding to social injustice.  Bad air in 
overcrowded subways likewise induces anxiety, as does logical inconsistency, and this weighs into decision 
making and action.  We experience healthy physical attraction and gravitate towards nourishing foods, even if 
evolutionary time lag leads to sexual excess or disposes us overmuch towards salt, fat and sugar—a 
predilection that was beneficial in past conditions of scarcity.  While reason similarly serves us much of the 
time, it can be problematic—or in other words, cease to be reasonable—if emotionally insensitive, as when 
addressing a romantic dispute with a logically succinct email with an opening thesis, supporting points, and a 
conclusion.  More formal examples come from research showing that brain damage impeding emotional-
 
50 James (1879), pp. 950-956. 
51 See Crippen (2018); Crippen (2019a). 
52 James (1879), p. 952 
53 Dennett (2006), Ch. 7. 
54 Landgrave and Nowrasteh (2017). 
55 Cotter (2017), p. 46 
56 Harris (2006), pp. 48-49 
57 Dennett (2006), pp. 338; Harris (2004), p. 12. 
58 Hitchens (2007), p. 13 
59 Hitchens (2007), p. 56. 
60 Dawkins (2006), pp. 97-103. 
61 Dawkins (2006), pp. 97-99. 
62 Dawkins (2006), pp. 97-98. 
63 Dawkins (2006), Ch. 2; Hitchens (2007), pp. 254-255. 
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visceral response augurs ruinous decision making and actions.64  The take home point is that Dawkins is wrong 
to insinuate that the psychological appeal of belief implies its irrationality. 
 
In identifying memes with religious belief, Dawkins suggests that theistic claims are not affirmed by 
what conventionally counts as evidence.  Yet contra Dawkins, this does not translate into a refusal to test 
beliefs.  Genuine faith, after all, entails life-altering commitment and hence modified actions.  Actions, in turn, 
actualize realities and hence experiences that may buttress but also challenge the practical wisdom of what was 
initially taken on faith.  Thus acting on faith means risking belief.  Critically, moreover, we are rarely 
positioned to believe whatever we want because we cannot act however we want since the world supplies 
resistance.  Thus while acting on faith allows us to move mountains in the earlier discussed senses, it leaves us 
unable to walk on water or see all the world’s kingdoms from a high mountain, as Jesus was said to have 
done.65  If working as a geologist or just interacting within educated circles, we may also find it difficult to act 
on the belief that the universe is 6000 years old.  The point is that we test beliefs by acting on them; the world 
promotes and thwarts certain actions; it thereby generates evidence supporting or challenging certain beliefs, 
be they scientific or religious. 
 
Another complaint carried in the meme critique of religion is that followers encourage devotion on the 
mere grounds that believing is the virtuous thing to do.66  Though a legitimate concern, it is not unique to 
religion.  Anticipating the position advanced by the four most prominent New Atheists,67 James notes that one 
of his contemporaries “calls it ‘guilt’ and ‘sin’ to believe even the truth without ‘scientific evidence.’”68  Still 
another banal position that New Atheists reject is that science has nothing to say about religious claims.  New 
Atheists finger multiculturalism, injunctions to be inoffensive and religious propaganda for this truism.69  
However, scientists adopting attitudes in the vein of New Atheism share blame by ridiculing serious 
investigation of religious claims, and thus scaring researchers from the pursuit, much as Dawkins claims fear 
of God frightens theists from religious heterodoxy.  Scientists also flee from spiritual debates by retreating into 
halfway empiricism.  For example, some presume that nature is exclusively mechanical, and consequently that 
alleged evidence for non-mechanical realities must always be incorrect.  They accordingly maintain the 
position not because of evidence, but irrespective of it.  Further, if spiritual phenomena are not amenable to 
mechanistic understandings, then they are precluded from consideration before even looking at evidence. 
 
Throughout their writings, New Atheists further object that religious belief fosters environments 
favoring its own continuance.  Once again, this is a general issue and not unique to religion.  Thus while one 
presumes the leadership of the Democratic Party wants a more diverse, prosperous and inclusive America, and 
accordingly advocates fewer barriers to voting, education and immigration, these policies promote its 
continued existence.  They do because people lacking ID, the better educated and recent immigrants all lean 
toward the Democratic Party.  Republican policy goes in the opposite direction.  For the sake of argument, 
charitably assume that this is because its leadership believes that showing ID may slightly reduce voter fraud, 
that less public funding for education preserves libertarian values and that reduced immigration protects jobs.  
However sincere these convictions may be, they unmistakably favor the Republican Party by 
disproportionately excluding those who would vote against it.  Comparable trends occur in the sciences.  For 
instance, behavioral scientists create laboratory environments that pace participants through structured tasks 
that limit responses to a finite number of discrete possibilities.  By doing this, the laboratory environment 
corrals behaviors into orders that can be mathematically converted into generalizable cause-and-effect 
relations; and by consistently not publishing statistically random results, the academic environment does much 
the same.  These procedures reflect faith in the principles of uniformity and causality, and they nurture 
outcomes conforming to them.  James says that “our thoughts determine our acts,” and “acts redetermine the ... 
nature of the world,”70 and scientists act to perpetuate their own metaphysics. 
 
64 For example, Damasio (1994), Chs. 3-4; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel and Damasio (1997), pp. 1293-1295. 
65 See Mark 6:45-56; Matthew 4:8; Matthew 14:22-33 
66 For example, Dawkins (2006), p. 199; Hitchens, Dawkins, Harris and Dennett (2019), pp. 54-57. 
67 See Hitchens, Dawkins, Harris and Dennett (2019), throughout. 
68 James (1982), p. 71 
69 See generally Hitchens, Dawkins, Harris and Dennett (2019). 
70 James (1909), p. 774. 
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A summative response to New Atheism can be found in the last paragraphs of James’s posthumously 
published Some Problems of Philosophy.  There, James invites us to call upon faith not merely as an attitude 
that may be taken, but one that must be.  In struggling with the question of what kinds of belief we ought to 
risk in a precarious world, James asserts there are four attitudes we can adopt.  First, we can wait for evidence, 
and do nothing while waiting. Second, we can mistrust, and feeling certain things will fail, do nothing to 
prevent this from happening.  Third, we can trust in spite of all the uncertainty, and take action to secure goals.  
Fourth, we can vacillate randomly between these various attitudes.71  James reduces this list to two options.  
He rejects the fourth as “no systematic solution,” and observes the first and second attitude are practically 
indistinguishable.72  The basic choice, then, is between mistrust and trust—a dilemma James explains by way 
of analogy.  When first meeting people, we can remain suspicious until evidence shows them trustworthy; or 
we can trust them until such a time—if it ever comes—that they prove untrustworthy.  In either case, we 
initially act on beliefs lacking empirical justification, which is to say, we act on faith.  If we assume that 
another is not trustworthy, and behave in a distant, suspicious manner, we are likely to provoke an unfriendly 
response that is consistent with the stance we initially took on faith.  If assuming the obverse, chances increase 
that we will cultivate a warm trusting relationship.  The choice, then, is not between faith and non-faith, but 
between two varieties of faith: one based on mistrust, the other on trust.  
 
Of these two options, James thinks the second wiser.  It is wiser because adopting trusting attitudes 
and believing what we desire is—if all else is equal—the more emotionally fulfilling option.  As importantly, 
trust is likely to bring us closer to truth.  Scientists often believe a theory before obtaining compelling evidence 
for it.  Yet by trusting the theory—which here means acting on it—they may generate supporting evidence.  
They may also generate disconfirming evidence.  Thus as natural selection extinguishes maladaptive 
variations, “the long run of experience may weed out the more foolish faiths.  Those who held them will then 
have failed,” and so much the better, James argues, for this also sets us on a truer path.73  James’s response to 
skeptics, then, is that their faith in failure is self-fulfilling.  By refusing to act on trust, they forego powerful 
instruments by which they might vindicate particular beliefs, acknowledge certain truths, and therewith 
ameliorate skepticism.  For this reason, he insists it is stubborn skepticism—not faith founded on trust—that is 
irrational.  As he puts it in The Will to Believe: “a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from 
acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there would be an irrational rule.”74 
 
Lessons for New Atheists? 
 
I have offered an account that perhaps provides lessons to New Atheists, and not just about where they 
are too extreme, but also about how they might defend their positions more cogently.  This might in turn help 
the religious reflect more critically on their own beliefs, thereby instilling a fuller understanding among 
devotees, whether or not they decide to abandon their convictions. 
 
Earlier, we saw that Harris mocked faith for being self-fulfilling, but the same in fact applies to many 
arguments advanced by New Atheists.  Though Dennett is more moderate, Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens start 
with the assumption that religion is false and vile.  This introduces a range of confirmation biases.  Dawkins 
excoriates religious justifications of slavery,75 and Hitchens derides the passivism of Quakers,76 both of them 
neglecting that members of this group, among others, risked themselves fighting to abolish human trafficking.  
Dawkins outlandishly speculates that religious upbringing is worse than sexual abuse,77 and outrageously 
laments that the “status of atheists in America today is on a par with that of homosexuals fifty years ago,”78 
exhibiting an unfounded persecution complex that seems to guide much of his inquiry. 
 
71 These four points are paraphrased from James (1911), p. 1100. 
72 James (1911), p. 1100. 
73 James (1911), p. 1101 
74 James (1896), p. 477. 
75 For example, Dawkins (2006), Ch. 7. 
76 Hitchens, Dawkins, Harris and Dennett (2019), pp. 125-126. 
77 Dawkins (2006), pp. 317-318. 
78 Dawkins (2006), p. 4. 
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Confirmation bias similarly infects New Atheist assessments of religious scripture.  While ideas 
repugnant or foolish from the standpoint of Western progressivism can certainly be found, New Atheists vastly 
exaggerate the extent to which this is so.  Dennett, for example, pokes fun at the naivety of  God molding 
Adam out of dirt,79 not really recognizing that it is doubtful that ancient Hebrews took this story literally.  
After all, the story is immediately preceded by a different version where humankind is generated from the 
divine word and in the image of God.80  The story of Jonah similarly was not completely in earnest, but was a 
humorous narrative that audiences “would enjoy ... and not be forced to choose whether it could actually have 
happened or not.”81  Such is commonly taught in Catholic seminary, as is the fact that the Septuagint—the 
Greek translation of the Tanakh or Old Testament—incorrectly renders the Hebrew word for “young woman” 
as “virgin” in passages prophesizing about the mother of the Messiah to come.  Greek speaking authors of the 
New Testament offered accounts consistent with this mistranslation.  Harris seems to think this point is 
devastating,82 not appreciating it is old news to educated believers and not particularly threatening since a 
young woman can simultaneously be a virgin. 
 
A problem, in effect, is that Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens—Dennett again the exception—are not 
really putting their beliefs to the test.  This is not to claim they should give religion a try, and see how it sits 
with them.  Instead, it is to suggest that they should be sensitive to the contours of the tenets they are 
endeavoring to repudiate rather than cramming their interpretations of religious ideas into their own pre-
existing narratives.  Their critiques often just float free from things they are attempting to address; therefore, 
they do not make significant contact and benefit from intellectual friction that would hone what they say, 
softening overreaches, while perhaps enhancing the all-around incisiveness of their accounts.  Indeed, it is 
sometimes as if they are channeling their inner Donald Trump, to put it anachronistically, and entering a world 
of alternative facts, complete with pejorative language.  Hitchens, for example, titles his 2007 book God Is Not 
Great: How Religion Poisons Everything,83 and goes on to wrongly claim John Adams owned slaves,84 and 
talks as if Friedrich Nietzsche really thought there was a moment when God died,85 as opposed to being an 
atheist predicting the demise of otherworldly values.  He also claims that a Texas governor once said that 
English was good enough for Jesus, a story that appears apocryphal, however much we liberals may want it to 
be true.86  Dawkins satirically counters St. Anselm’s and St. Aquinas’s ontological arguments for the existence 
of God, indicating Christians are too stupid to pick up on flaws.87  His rebuttal in fact fatuously repeats the 
repudiation of Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, a Christian monk and contemporary of Anselm. 
 
Harris, in his turn, does not take time to understand the religion he hates most: Islam.  In The End of 
Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, he regularly treats Qur’anic verses as self-sufficient atomic 
units when their meaning typically emerges out of a larger gestalt.  For example, verses 6-7 of Al-Nur (The 
Light) states that a man’s testimony about his wife’s infidelity will be accepted if he makes four oaths and then 
a fifth inviting God’s curse if he is lying.  This sounds bad.  But verse 8-9 clarifies that a woman averts 
condemnation if she makes four oaths to the contrary, and invites God’s curse in a fifth.  Much of the Qur’an 
has this structure, though not always compressed neatly into four adjacent verses.  Unlike the Bible, the Qur’an 
has no stoning.  Although women and men suffer 100 lashes for adultery,88 it turns out that required evidence 
is practically unobtainable since the text demands four trustworthy witnesses who observed the illicit sexual 
 
79 Dennett (2006), p. 210; also see Genesis 2:7-23 
80  Genesis 1:26-27 
81 Boadt (1984), p. 468 
82 Harris (2004), 94-95 
83 Despite his harsh title and rhetoric, Hitchens—to be fair—is arguably gentler and more sensitive to cultural nuances of religion 
than Dawkins and Harris, perhaps because of his extensive travels and first hand contact as a journalist.  That said, he is little 
better with facts. 
84 Hitchens (2007), p.181. 
85 Hitchens (2007), p. 67. 
86 Hitchens (2007), p. 110. 
87 Dawkins (2006), Ch. 3. 
88 24:2. 
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intercourse.89  It is plausible, then, these passages were offered to prevent harsh treatment, while still 
emphasizing adultery as the serious taboo that it was in ancient Middle Eastern culture by keeping the severe 
punishment on the record.  
 
The above highlights a principle of informal logic articulated by R. G. Collingwood, who holds that 
the meaning of statements depends on the questions or problems they are meant to answer.90  Thus the 
connotation of the statement “I threw the ring in the garbage” will vary depending on whether the question was 
“Where is your wedding ring?” or “Where is that cheap, plastic novelty ring?”91  That identically worded 
statements carry different connotations when responding to different questions means that we cannot hope to 
understand texts merely by reading the words in them.  We must also appreciate historically specific problems 
that texts were intended to answer.92  The near impossible evidential standards for convicting someone of 
adultery and the likelihood that the edict was intended to curtail heavy punishments is a case in point, and there 
are many others.  Hitchens, for instance, mocks the temporary marriages permitted in Shia but not Sunni 
Islam,93 and such practices can indeed be troubling, as when older business men exploit vulnerable woman, 
sometimes below the age of consent, though this is hardly unique to the Muslim world.  Notice that Westerners 
also have short-term relationships, and temporary marriage allows Shia Muslims to do the same within the 
confines of their religion and the political context of countries like Iran.  In principle, moreover, the marriage is 
meant to ensure financial obligation for any offspring that ensue.  Given the almost adolescent fixation with 
religious limits on sexual freedom found in the work of Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens, it is puzzling that any 
of them take issue with Muslims interested in temporary liaisons. 
 
New Atheists have a particularly troubling  tendency to decouple religion from sociopolitical facts.  
Harris does this when identifying Islam itself as a primary root of terrorism, adding that Muslims are too 
backwards for democracy, and engaging in apologetics for U.S. foreign policy.94  When convenient, New 
Atheists also inject religion into sociopolitical affairs, with  Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens all suggesting that 
Adolph Hitler was a closet Christian.95  In short, New Atheists fall into a facts-be-damned attitude, and thus 
slide into sweeping, non-evidentially backed, self-verifying attacks.  This not only generates misinformation, 
but deprives religious devotees of a rigorous exchange that might help them better understand their own 
religions, whether or not they decide to remain committed.  
 
A lesson emphasized in many of today’s research practices—and in pragmatic philosophy  too—is 
that we make progress by focusing on particulars, and avoiding grand generalizations.  A problem with 
sweeping claims is that they entail encompassing negations.  Materialism, for example, is the universal claim 
that all real objects are physical.  More formally, it holds that for any x, if x is real, then x is physical, or ∀x(Rx 
→ Px).  This is equivalent to negating the existential claims that non-physical realities exist.  It logically 
implies that there is no x such that x is real and not physical, or  ¬∃x (Rx ∧ ¬P x).  The same applies to the 
metaphysical proposition that all reality is mathematizable or the proposition that all reality operates 
mechanistically: these assertions, too, are sweeping negations.  Moreover, while these metaphysical 
propositions are useful starting points in specific scientific domains, it is difficult to see what is gained by 
asserting that every last nanometer of the universe abides by these principles.  Metaphysical standpoints are in 
fact the mother of all confirmation biases, and it is not safe to assume they are true since some taken to be so in 
the past have shown cracks.  The metaphysical supposition that time and space are absolute is now pressed by 
relativity, and quantum mechanics may be opening holes in the principle of causality.  Dynamic systems 
theory likewise raises questions about conventional mechanistic metaphysics.   
 
 
89 24:4. Note that these passages and hence the four-witness rule do not apply to rape, though too often this is misconstrued both 
inside and outside of Islamic culture. 
90 R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1939), 31-39 & 74 
91 Crippen (2019), p. 151, fn. 1. 
92 Collingwood (1939), 61-63. 
93 Hitchens (2007), p. 46. 
94 For example, Harris (2004), Ch. 4. 
95 Dawkins (2006), p. 310; Harris (2004), p. 106; Hitchens (2007), 236-243; for further analysis, see Cotter (2017), p. 43. 
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New Atheists stray far beyond what they actually know.  A more fruitful and honest approach would 
be to avoid sweeping flourishes, such as Hitchens claiming in the subtitle of his book that religion poisons 
everything.  The approach would lend itself to a more accurate account, and one that might play a role in 
rooting out certain ills that are found in religious culture.  This would necessitate difficult tasks, such as sifting 
through histories and carefully studying scriptures, ideally in their original languages; it would mean 
consulting religious scholars to be sure of rendering defensible interpretations from scripture before launching 
attacks, and not following Dawkins by simply repeating 1000 year old criticisms that theists have already 
launched against their own religions; it would involve seriously examining political, economic and social 
factors inflecting religion, perhaps traveling so as to immerse within affected cultures and geographic regions, 
something that would especially benefit Harris’s work.  Above all, it would entail not writing for those already 
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